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This paper presents part of the findings of an extensive field research undertaken in 2011 on 
Palestinian non-governmental organizations (PNGOs) governance in the West Bank. To serve this 
purpose, the research investigated PNGOs’ accountability, specifically the assumption that PNGOs, 
individually and collectively, are more accountable to their donors and to the Palestinian authority than 
to their constituencies and the communities they work for. The findings confirm that board of director 
and general assembly appear to have limited power and cannot hold PNGOs management accountable. 
This differential influence is potentially linked to the historical development of NGOs under occupation 
as well as to the unique political situation of the occupied Palestinian territories (oPT) throughout the 
second half of the twentieth century. This research concluded that, in order to reverse this current 
accountability trend, most PNGOs need to activate their general assemblies and board of directors, and 
improve their connections to their grassroots so as to be more accountable to their constituencies, 
local communities, and the Palestinian public at large. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
There is a growing concern from both the public and 
researchers regarding the accountability of Palestinian 
non-governmental organizations, (PNGOs) in the 
occupied Palestinian territories
1
 (Hanafi and Tabar, 2005; 
Songco et al., 2006). The concern is invoked mainly by 
questioning what motivated the creation of PNGOs which 
essentially filters down to three factors: personal motives 
of individual founding members, their relationships to 
political factions, and the way these organizations would 
be used to support the factions‟ agenda and popularity 
(Awashra, 2011). The mushrooming of PNGOs in the 
West Bank, from a mere 210  in  1987  (Horani,  1988)  to 
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 The “Occupied Territories” refer to Gaza Strip, the West Bank and East 
Jerusalem, and Golan Heights all of which fall outside the Green Line and were 
occupied by Israeli in 1967. UN agencies, the International court of Justice and 
the International Committee of the Red Cross use the term to indicate all of 
four areas. In this thesis, the term “Occupied Palestinian Territories” refers to 
the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. See the Question of Palestine 
and the United Nations http://www.un.org/Depts/dpi/palestine/. 
2319 in 2010 (Palestinian Authority Ministry of Interior 
Affairs Record, 2011), has raised the doubts about the 
impact of PNGOs‟ work, and the role played by the 
donors and their agendas (Songco et al., 2006). In 
addition, NGOs face criticism from the public and 
researchers on the ground of their neglect to responding 
to the needs and priorities of the general public and local 
communities (Hanafi and Tabar, 2005; Jad, 2007; 
Songco et al., 2006). 
According to the Charitable and Community 
Organizations Law No. 1 of 2000, issued by the 
Palestinian Authority (PA), PNGOs exist to service the 
public and the groups they represent (that is, women, 
youth, workers, students, disabled, etc.) in various fields 
(health, social welfare, education, cultural, human rights, 
and participation in public policy). In addition, NGOs 
should contribute in the Palestinian struggle for achieving 
the liberation of the occupied Palestinian territories (oPT) 
and other national goals by supporting the steadfastness 
of the public (Hanafi and Tabar, 2005). Assistance public 
steadfastness mainly sticks on their lands via different 
tools: reclamation of their lands, providing services 
according to their needs, enhancing their national identity 
  
 
 
 
and solidarity, mobilizing people for resisting the 
occupation or whatever strategies people have or might 
choose. 
PNGOs‟ accountability and priorities have been 
redefined in the aftermath of Oslo Accords and PA 
creation in 1994 in which donors classified the oPT as a 
post conflict zone. This development has had an impact 
on PNGOs‟ roles and activities including their contribution 
to „human development‟ through media, networking, 
advocacy and other activities that seek to influence public 
opinion and re-shape public policies (Ashrawi, 2009). 
Current role of donors is working within the sphere of the 
occupation, to keep oPT under the sovereignty of the 
occupation. So, the funded activities in the non-profit 
sectors are basically serving western political agendas in 
protecting Israeli interests and diverting the focus of the 
Palestinian leadership, organizations and people from 
fighting to befriend the Israeli occupation (Nakhleh, 2011; 
Hamdan, 2010). Donors‟ projects include promoting 
economic collaboration, and working with occupation 
authority to make several military checks point 
permanent. They divided the West Bank into several 
parts, funded substitute roads for Palestinians and kept 
roads for colony settles in the West Bank (Hamdan, 
2010).  PNGOs‟ projects that focus on women, gender, 
seminars, workshops, dialogue do not help Palestinians 
to free their lands and build their independent state. This 
is to say that PNGOs‟ funded projects do not help in 
achieving Palestinian national goals (Hanafi and Taber, 
2005). 
Moreover, PA and PNGOs behave as if an 
independent, sovereign Palestinian state actually exists; 
despite the fact that the Israeli occupation is still present 
and in control of almost all the territory and aspect of life 
in the oPT. It is no secret that donors‟ operations must be 
authorized by the Israeli to the point where many donors‟ 
projects are indefinitely halted or prevented in certain 
Palestinians areas (for example areas C and Jerusalem
2
) 
(United Nation- Security Conical. 2012; The UN Refugee 
Agency, 2012). Donors‟ agencies usually have no other 
choice but to comply with the Israeli orders, and curtail 
Palestinian NGOs activities to suit the Israeli interests.  
PNGOs become more dependent on foreign aid, as 
more than 78.3% of them depend on foreign donor 
compared to those depending on income generation 
activities or local donations, of about 12.4% and 5.3%, 
respectively (De Voir and Tartir, 2009). This article 
argues that due to financial need PNGOs are likely to 
follow the political motives of their donors. Our findings 
suggest that PNGOs have grown increasingly 
accountable to their donors and to PA than to their 
constituencies, the communities in general or to the 
Palestinian national goals. Often times, researchers focus 
more on the examination of PNGOs‟ accountability to  PA   
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from a strictly legal point of view but they fail to 
investigate their accountability to the public or governing 
bodies (Al-Moaqat, 2007). Researchers also neglect to 
discuss the link between NGOs‟ accountability and their 
sense of identity, vision and legitimacy or to address the 
link between PNGOs missions and the actualization of 
Palestinian national goals (Al-Moaqat, 2007). 
Accountability has many definitions. In this article, the 
working definition is a process of ensuring that 
stakeholders are involved in public participation, 
organizations policy process and decision making, in a 
way without having negative consequences on the public 
presently and in future. In addition, this process needs 
mechanism to ensure the implementation of the concept 
via practical tools such as administrative, financial, social 
and appraisal tools. 
This paper intends to answer two important questions. 
First, the extent to which PNGOs are accountable to their 
stakeholders, including local communities, the Palestinian 
Authority, donors, and Palestinian national goals. 
Second, to examine which mechanisms, tools or 
processes PNGOs utilize, or need to put in place, in order 
to improve accountability. For the purposes of this paper, 
the Palestinian national goals are defined as: a) building 
an independent Palestinian state with the 1967 
boundaries freed from Israeli occupation and b) 
observing the right to return for Palestinian refugee to 
their home lands in historical Palestine (1948 areas)
3
. To 
the Palestinian society, independent statehood, total 
Israeli withdrawal from the 1967, and ensuring the right of 
all Palestinian refugees to return are the national goals to 
achieve even though the Oslo Accords relegated them to 
final negotiations between the PA and the Israeli 
Government not as rights to be respected but as mere 
outcomes determined by the power imbalance between 
the negotiating parties (National Accord Document, 
2006)
4
. 
The assumption is that PNGOs are accountable first to 
their donors and PA. This is because both stakeholders 
have power to exercise over PNGOs; donors through 
their funds and the PA exercising legal and security 
power. 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This paper presents initial findings of a study on governance in 
PNGO sector undertaken in 2010 and 2011 in the West Bank. The 
research includes two perception surveys conducted on a sample 
of 40 PNGOs, filled by top management, board members, general 
managers, and 100 staff (Appendix). The respondents to both 
surveys were chosen randomly from the PNGOs registry at the PA 
Ministry of Interior (MoI) in Ramallah. In addition, fifty of interviews 
were carried out with NGOs board members,  directors,  community
                                                             
3
 These goals constitute the minimum national agenda agreed upon by 
Palestinian political parties (including Hamas), known as National Accord 
Document signed in Gaza Strip in 2006. http://reut-
institute.org/Publication.aspx?PublicationId=351. 
4
 The National Accord Document is available on the Reut Institute Website. 
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Table 1. Respondents satisfaction of NGOs internal accountability (on a scale of 1 to 5: weak (1 to 2), satisfactory (3), and good 
(4 to 5)). 
 
Statement Weak Satisfactory Good 
General assembly do participate in decision making process 23 9 8 
General assembly should participate in decision making 0 1 39 
GA members do participate in general assembly meetings 26 9 5 
GA members should participate in general assembly meetings 3 2 35 
Board members do participate in Board meeting 10 18 12 
Board members should participate in Board meeting 1 0 39 
NGO board does lead the NGO 21 12 7 
NGO board should lead the NGO 1 0 39 
NGO senior management do interact with the public 21 15 4 
NGO senior managements should interact with the public 0 3 37 
 
Respondents were board of director and top management for 40 Palestinian NGOs in the West Bank. 
 
 
 
activists, researchers and officials of the central and local 
authorities and members of the PA Legislative Council and PA 
officials in the executive branch (ministries and the Office of the 
President of Palestinian Authority). The organizations that have 
been observed are used as representative of PNGOs as a whole. 
The sample was selected randomly and covered organizations 
engaging in service delivery, advocacy and public policy, and 
combination of both. The study has a number of limitations basically 
from the small sample size (40 organizations in 6 out of the 11 West 
Bank‟ districts cover: Ramallah, Nablus, Jerusalem, Hebron, 
Tulkarm and Salfeet)
6
. 
 
Based on the working definition of accountability, this steers the 
analysis to highlight two major angles: 
 
1) To which stakeholders should PNGOs, individually or collectively 
be accountable for? 
2) Where does accountability stem from with each of these 
stakeholders? 
 
 
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
 
NGOs internal accountability 
 
Internal accountability refers to the manners in which the 
responsibilities in organizational structure are being met 
by the three parties designated by the law in force: (a) 
General Assembly (GA), (b) Board of Directors (BoDs), 
and (c) senior management (SM) 
As indicated in Table 1, the findings point out to the 
phenomena of invisible and shrinking GAs and the 
monopolization of decision making power by the PNGO 
senior management BoDs (Mohammad, 3 February 
2011; Hamdan, 10 February 2011 - Communication). The 
respondents believe that the involvement of GAs in 
NGOs‟ decision making is very weak as 23 of 
respondents are not satisfied of the current level of 
participation. 10 of respondents are not satisfied of the 
commitment of the BoD members even in attending  their 
                                                             
6
 The sample did not cover the entire PNGOs sectors, geographical areas, due 
to non-availability of funds as the data is collected through self-funded 
research. 
periodical meetings while only 4 of respondents are 
satisfied of the current level of interaction between the 
public and PNGOs management. The majority of 
respondents also called for a greater role for both 
structures (39 respondents call for GAs and BoDs) and a 
substantial increase in their active participation. All 
respondents unanimously agreed that the BoD, rather 
than the executive management, should be the body 
leading the NGO coupled with a greater involvement of 
GA members in decision-making. 
The aforementioned results acknowledge the potentials 
of both governance bodies to exercise so much power 
invested in them by the PNGOs‟ law
8
, including the 
dissolution of the NGO. However, the current low 
participation rate may be construed as lack of desire by 
GAs and BoDs to actually assume their roles or seriously 
hold SM accountable to them. The accountabilities tools 
presented in Table 2 point out to the legal, managerial, 
and legislative power that the GAs and BoDs have to 
lead and guide NGO‟s role for serving the public. The 
field research shows that general managers or executive 
directors dominate their NGOs. 
These conclusions are the cross tabulation of 
information collected by organizational survey and 
interviews using the various research tools. “Low” reflects 
informants‟ opinions that PNGOs are not doing what is 
required or expected of them to do in a particular area. A 
“Low-medium” indicates that NGOs are trying but their 
performance is not as good as expected. “High” indicates 
that NGOs performance is actually as it should be in that 
specific area. 
As for PNGOs‟ accountability to beneficiaries and point 
to a very low level of public participation and PNGOs‟ 
accountability to the public they serve. The public rarely 
takes part, or are asked to take part, in planning and 
monitoring   of   NGOs‟  activities.  The  findings  seem  to 
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 Palestinian Law No (1) of (2000) ascribed certain accountability to the PA 
and the GA exercised through PNGOs reporting mechanisms and regular 
annual meetings to discuss organization’ financial and administrative reports.  
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Table 2. Participants‟ perceptions of actual involvement of NGO governance bodies and beneficiaries.  
 
Involvement  General assembly Board of directors Target groups/Beneficiaries 
Members perception of legal power by the PNGOs law High  High  Low 
Actual assumption of power Low Low - medium Low 
Participation in strategic planning  Low Low - medium Low 
Participation in periodical meetings  Low-medium  Low - medium  Low 
Monitoring adherence to NGO mission  Low Low - medium Low 
Monitoring NGO projects  Low  Low  Low 
NGO monitoring and evaluation  Low  Low  Low 
Monitoring donors‟ involvement Low  Low - Medium Low 
 
 
 
Table 3. Respondents‟ satisfaction of NGOs external accountability.  
 
Statement Good Satisfactory Weak 
NGOs are accountable towards PA 8 13 19 
NGOs accountability should be towards the PA 28 7 5 
NGO accountability is towards the public  8 14 18 
NGOs accountability should be towards public 29 - 1 
The public has access to information on NGOs 8 11 21 
The public should be able to access information on NGOs  37 2 1 
NGOs accountability is towards donors 18 10 12 
NGOs accountability should be towards donors  28 7 5 
NGOs accountability is towards national goals  8 15 17 
NGOs accountability should be towards national goals  38 1 1 
 
Respondents were board of director and top management for 40 Palestinian NGOs in the West Bank. 
 
 
 
confirm that PNGOs‟ perception of public participation 
and down-ward accountability is influenced by the 
„Reporting to Donor Mentality‟ and „clients-like 
relationship with the community‟ stemming basically from 
NGOs‟ lack of identity and clear vision (Kuttab, 15 March, 
2011; Radwan, 25 April, 2011; Abu Keshik, 15 January, 
2011 - Communication). It is hard for PNGOs to ensure 
their accountability to the Palestinian society because 
they treat them as „service recipients‟ rather than 
stakeholders (Hamdan, 10 February, 2011 - 
Communication). 
 
 
NGOs’ external accountability 
 
Here,  the findings of this study present NGOs‟ external 
accountability especially towards PA and the public which 
remains weak unlike their accountability towards their 
donors. Almost half of the surveyed sample said that 
PNGOs‟ accountability towards the public is 67% 
compared to the PA. They believe that accountability to 
donors is the primary aim of Palestinian NGOs. All 
respondents believe that NGOs should be accountable to 
the Palestinian public and national goals first and then to 
the donors and the PA. 
While it  is  noticeable  in  Table  3  that  some  PNGOs 
characterized their accountability towards their donors as 
high and in need for re-direction in favor of public 
accountability, more respondents prefer accountability to 
donors to PA. This seems to be contradictory to the 
respondents‟ conviction of accountability to national 
goals, which to them seems distinct from accountability to 
the PA. 
 
 
Accountability to the PA 
 
The above findings show that NGOs‟ accountability to the 
PA in the West Bank is weaker than that demonstrated to 
donor agencies. About 47% of respondents believe that 
NGOs are not accountable to the PA, and another 38% 
are not happy with their current accountability. Less that 
15% believe they are indeed accountable to the 
Palestinian public authorities. These results also show 
that NGOs community in general is more accountable to 
the authorities than to their communities. The percentage 
of respondents who believe there are accountable to the 
PA and national goals is close to 28 and 15%, 
respectively. 
Table 3 also reveals that most surveyed NGOs stated 
feel accountability to PA and national priorities should be 
improved despite all procedures and practices introduced 
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by the Palestinian MoI and donors. Paradoxically, 
PNGOs do not abide by or follow PA plans in their own 
programming. Zagha noted that NGOs do not take PA 
plans seriously or use them to inform their interventions  
(Zagha, 10 February, 2011 - Communication). For 
example, an agricultural PNGO is not aware of Ministry of 
Agriculture‟s plans (El-taher, 15 March 2011 - 
Communication), although the ministry is supposedly the 
competent entity with the mandate to define national 
priorities and future directions. To PNGOs staff, the 
World Bank -facilitated PA plans only benefit specific 
group of people, mainly the rich elites (Kuttab, 15 March, 
2011 - Communication), and were developed in absence 
of „true and full partnership‟ with Palestinian civil society 
and the public. Some NGOs leaders called for full 
partnership in which NGOs can have a real word in the 
decision-making over the PA plans” (Zedan, 15 February, 
2011 - Communication). The point is that NGOs‟ 
accountability is very much related to that of the 
government. The PA and NGOs have to work together to 
develop and carry out national and sectored plans 
(Khresheh, 3 April, 2011 - Communication). In this 
regard, it is worth mentioning that the Welfare 
Association tries to address such a gap in PA planning 
processes (Dwaik, 22 April, 2011 - Communication). 
 
 
NGOs’ accountability to donors 
 
Table 3 also reveals that even PNGOs leaders are aware 
of donor accountability prevalence in the NGO sector. 
Donors control the purse and determine where and how 
their money is spent. In other words donors are the ones 
who determine PNGOs agendas (El-taher, 15 March, 
2011; Hamdan, 10 February, 2011; Kuttab, 15 March 
2011 - Communication) and have become the „upper 
hand‟ (Dwaik, 22 April, 2011 - Communication). It is for 
this reason that PNGOs comply with donor requirements, 
sometimes when it is not mandatory. Accountability to 
donors is practiced through various tools requiring the 
dedication of time and effort by PNGO executives and 
personnel for routine paper work (e.g. authorization 
requests, updates, progress reports, audits, payment 
requests, accounting papers, beneficiary lists, bill of 
quantities and success stories to name but a few) 
(Hamdan, 10 February, 2011 - Communication). This 
sounds like huge amounts of information are provided to 
donors compared to the general managerial and financial 
reports that go yearly to the PA.  Sarsour, a consultant, 
shared similar experience with NGOs modifying their 
missions partially or entirely to fit with donors‟ agendas. 
As a result, these organizations tend to limit public 
participation so that the PNGOs remain functionally and 
strategically able to fulfill their donor accountabilities 
more than those directed towards their clients or 
constituencies   (Sarsour,    26   April,   2011 - 
Communication). When these changes and practices are 
viewed in light of  personal  motives  behind  the  creation 
 
 
 
 
and management of PNGOs, it is possible to see the 
extent of donors‟ strength and domination over the entire 
sector and the alliance forged between PNGOs elites and 
their donors (Kuttab, 15 March, 2011 - Communication). 
 
 
Accountability to the Palestinian public 
 
Public accountability is usually exercised through the 
public‟s access to information and participation in NGO 
planning, need assessment, evaluation, organization 
decision making processes. Public participation is made 
easier when information is made available to the public in 
a timely manner. However, the research shows that 
NGOs produce and share very little information with the 
public, while their efforts for greater participatory 
practices are tokenism at best. For example, Palestinian 
urban-based NGOs run websites but limit these to basic 
standard information about NGOs missions, goals, 
projects and only some provide organization‟s structure. 
Urban based NGOs also produce publications, reports, 
and publicity and informational materials (e.g. brochures, 
flyers, magazines etc.). Some information is not publically 
disclosed but can be made available to researchers upon 
request. The public is less experienced than researcher in 
searching for information and approach NGOs and other 
sources. In comparison, small and rural-based 
organizations usually have no websites of their own; but 
they have web page linked to the websites of other NGOs 
organizations. Some produce low-quality brochures and 
standard program information but hesitate to share 
substantial information about their activities, projects and 
beneficiaries. 
In this regard, the study sample shows that only five out 
of 20 NGOs with website do actually publish their 
financial statements and audits which are usually 
presented as lump sum figures lacking sufficient details 
and breakdown. For these NGOs information of interest 
to the public is not published such as salaries and benefit 
packages of NGOs top layer of officials. Many interviewees 
suggested that NGOs should start providing the public 
with detailed budget, detailed financial statement, and 
information on salaries so as to enhance accountability 
and transparency (Hamdan, 10 February, 2011 - 
Communication).
9
 The public and PA believe that NGO 
employees receive high salaries. PA employees suggest 
the promulgation of a labor law pertaining only to the NGO 
sector (Radwan, 25 April, 2011 - Communication). 
 
 
Accountability to Palestinian national goals 
 
However, keeping in mind the ongoing occupation of the 
oPT, it is necessary to ensure that Palestinian 
organizations, including PNGOs contribute to or at least 
adopt a “do-not-harm approach” to the collective  societal 
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 The interviewee refused to provide financial information of her NGO. 
  
 
 
 
and political goals and make sure that their accountability 
is directed to the present generation and future ones. 
Whatever choices the current generation and their 
leaders take will inevitably influence the coming 
generations. Evidently, there is a general consensus 
among the Palestinian society that PNGOs should revise 
their agendas and rethink their accountabilities and 
governance. Without having a clear agenda, governance 
and accountability remain non- existent in the NGO 
sector (Kuttab, 15 March, 2011 - Communication). As 
Table 3 indicates, the current level of NGOs‟ 
accountability to national goals, which is the most 
important one, is really weak. 
Approximately, 78% of respondents believe that it is 
indeed weak compared to the remaining 28% who think 
that NGOs have a good level of accountability to national 
goals. Another alarming finding is that the majority of 
respondents and interviewees met during the field 
research stress two interrelated issues: NGOs function 
with a donor- driven agenda and that their 
accountabilities are directed upwards towards their 
financiers. In other words, donors control the recipients of 
their support: a fact frequently admitted by the directors 
and general managers of PNGOs themselves (Dwaik, 22 
April, 2011; Hammad, 20 February, 2011; El-taher, 15 
March, 2011; Abu Keshik, 17 March, 2011 -
Communication). 
NGOs‟ accountability to their societies has yet another 
dimension. In areas like the oPT, where NGOs have to 
work on governance and peace-building, the physical 
separation between the West Bank and Gaza Strip and 
the political rift between Hamas and Fateh complicate an 
already complicated situation. On one hand, the military 
has become a means to resolve the deep difference 
between the two Palestinian parties. On the other hand, 
the political conflict has huge implications of the NGO 
especially with regard to their apparent failure to 
contribute to the promotion of democracy and good 
governance. Political conflict restricted the arena in which 
NGOs can work on policy reform and democracy; 
although it has further consolidated the “upper hand 
accountability” trend. The enforced accountabilities on 
PNGOs reveal the extent of their vulnerability vis-a-vis 
those in power within the context of the ongoing political 
divide. In such a situation, voices call for putting political 
factions, politics aside to enhance PNGOs‟ accountability 
and transparency (Bargouth, 16 March, 2011; Bargouthi, 
30 March, 2011 - Communication). 
Even though PNGOs, mainly urban working at district 
and West Bank levels, have become important new 
political actors in the oPT (Reyahi, 15 December, 2010 - 
Communication), they tend to function as private, 
nonprofit, professional organizations, based solely on 
their legal identity. While PNGOs should be naturally 
concerned with public welfare as ascribed to them by the 
pertinent law, their closed membership tend to make 
them citizens organizations per se. PNGOs organizations 
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such as CBOs, cooperatives, professional associations 
and trade unions. By comparison, PNGOs‟ stakeholders, 
identities and objectives are less stable, irrespective of 
funding and political changes. 
 
 
PNGOs’ ACCOUNTABILITY DILEMMA IN THE 
PALESTINIAN CONTEXT 
 
It is possible to interpret the study findings and attribute 
accountability trends to several factors which in turn 
contribute to the prevalence of PNGO accountability 
dilemma in the Palestinian context. 
Firstly, PNGOs‟ accountability to the public had eroded 
since the Second Intifada (2000-2003) where the PNGOs 
acted as the national struggle is not part of their missions 
but rather the sole role and responsibility of the PA and 
the public (Hanafi and Tabar, 2005). PNGOs have 
prioritized continuing their occupation; although 
participation in the national struggle is largely focused on 
monitoring Israeli measures and human rights violations, 
updating donors and external parties on the 
developments as they unfold on the ground (Hanafi and 
Tabar, 2005). 
Secondly, PNGOs have kept their focus on their own 
usual programs (women rights, democracy, human rights, 
etc.); the areas most preferable to donor funding. In other 
words, what donors want, donors get and the PNGOs 
have inevitably become preoccupied with survival and 
constant inflow of fund than to readjust their programs 
and working mechanism in line with the public‟s changing 
needs and priorities. 
Thirdly, PNGOs‟ accountability dilemma stems from the 
low level of public participation in NGOs. PNGOs 
recognize the public‟s lack of trust. The prevalent feeling 
among the wider society is that PNGOs are distant, self-
absorbed, and wasting foreign funds in activities lacking 
sufficient relevance. Sometimes, PNGOs themselves 
express such sentiments. 
Fourthly, PA is hostile to and suspicious of PNGOs 
because of their relentless critique of PA performance 
and policies and also because of the perceived alliance 
between NGOs and donors against the PA. The political 
affiliations of PNGOs themselves or their leaders 
determine to a large extent the approach PA adopts 
towards them. PA can be supportive but it can also put 
lots of hindrances before the organizations, particularly 
those perceived or known to be Hamas affiliated. Tens of 
charitable and faith-based organizations were hard by 
forced dissolution or closure orders in the West Bank. As 
expected, PA extends various levels of support to Fatah 
affiliated organizations and while it adopts a more tolerant 
approach towards those organizations with apolitical or 
neutral agendas which refrain from public criticism of the 
PA and shun  politics, focusing their efforts on attracting 
funds and continuous delivery of public services.  
Fifthly, some experts attribute the lack of  accountability 
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to the weak governing bodies inside PNGOs. This adds a 
new dimension to NGOs‟ accountability challenges and 
dependence in the one-person leadership model (Songco 
et al., 2006). Although legitimacy stems from the people 
they represent and serve (Jad, 2007), PNGOs in real life 
exhibit limited, narrow, partial interests of certain 
individuals even though this representation is the sole 
reason for the existence of any PNGO. Thus PNGOs are 
rendered worse than political parties in disregarding their 
internal constituencies in preference for narrow, power-
based self- serving interests. 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Since accountability should be oriented to all 
stakeholders, the identification of PNGOs‟ stakeholders is 
a necessary step towards promoting their accountabilities 
in the West Bank. To do this, PNGO and all organizations 
worldwide must first re-define, group and prioritize their 
stakeholders (Gray et al, 2006). PNGOs should 
intrinsically be tied up to their awareness and adoption of 
society‟s national goals and collective aspirations. The 
PNGO sector should adopt and strengthen their up- and 
downward accountability towards their internal and 
external stakeholders, most importantly the public. This 
goes beyond the PNGOs‟ strict adherence to national 
legislations and donors‟ procedures that set the (just or 
unjust) rules of the game. Upward accountability is 
reflection of power misbalances between the PNGOs at 
the recipient end and between authorities and donors 
whose motives for enforcing such powers may not always 
be for accountability and responsibility. Organizations 
should revive their governing structure and gear their 
evaluation, social audit, and reporting to keep PNGOs‟ 
accountabilities in check and to consolidate them.  
In addition, politically-affiliated organizations and 
political parties have to take their role in the consolidation 
of non-state actors‟ accountability, yet without 
interference in NGOs‟ affairs and functions. Political 
factions can coordinate their activities and link their 
strategic visions, working in parallel with PNGOs and 
public authorities to enhance national identity and 
collective rights. PNGOs should focus on empowering 
people and support their steadfastness by delivering 
services and directing their accountability to 
constituencies, local communities, and the public at large. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Research tools 
 
Organizational survey 
 
The survey was carried out on a sample of 40 organizations, randomly chosen from six West Bank districts, and drawn 
from the official NGOs registry at the Directorate General of NGOs at the Ministry of Interior in Ramallah. 
 
Table 1. Organizational survey sample. 
 
District Number of NGOs in the actual sample 
Ramallah 16 
Nablus 5 
Tulkarem  6 
Jerusalem 7 
Hebron 5 
Salfeet  1 
Total 40 
 
 
 
Staff survey  
 
The survey sample comprised of 31 organizations, randomly chosen from five West Bank districts. 
 
Table 2. Employees survey sample. 
 
West Bank Area District Number of organizations Questionnaires returned 
Central 
Ramallah 11 43 
Jerusalem 4 11 
 
North 
Nablus 5 14 
Tulkarm 6 17 
 
South Hebron 5 15 
Total 31 100 
 
 
 
List of Interviewees 
 
Abu Keshik T (2011). Founder and General Director, Association for Youth Development, Ramallah, 15 January. 
Bargouthi I (2011). Founder and Director, Ramallah Centre of Human Rights and Research, 16 March. 
Bargouthi M (2011). Founder and General Manager for Palestinian Youth Union, Ramallah, 30 March  
Dwaik A (2011). Program Operations Director, Welfare Association, Ramallah, 22 April. 
El-Taher A (2011). Executive Director, the Palestinian Centre for Economic and Social Development, Ramallah, 15 March. 
Hamdan I (2011). Founder and Administrative and Financial Manager at, Teacher Creative Centre, Ramallah, 10 
February. 
Hammad M (2011) Land Research Center (LRC), Hebron, 20 February. 
Khresheh I (2011). Secretary-General of the Palestinian Legislative Council, 3 April. 
Kuttab I (2011). Acting Director-General, Bisan Centre for Research and Development, 15 March.  
Mohammad J (2011) GA member of two urban NGOs; Bisan Centre for Research and Development, and The Union of 
Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC), 3 February. 
Radwan R (2011). Director – Department of Local Communities, PA- President Office, 25 April. 
Reyahi I (2010). Researcher at Bisan Centre for Research and Development, 15 December. 
Sarsour S (2011). NGO Consultant, Ramallah, 26 April. 
Zagha A (2011). Professor in Economics, Birzeit University, Ramallah, 10 February. 
Zedan M (2011). Founder, Chairperson at the Coalition of Civil Society and Executive Director El- Shraa- Tulkarem, 15 
February. 
